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In Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism,1 we presented a framework for interpreting Congress’s September 18, 2001
Authorization for Use of Military Force2 (AUMF), the central statutory
enactment related to the war on terrorism. Congressional Authorization addressed a puzzling gap in the academic literature: although
both constitutional theory and constitutional practice suggest that the
validity of presidential wartime actions depends to a significant degree
on their relationship to congressional authorization, the meaning and
implications of the AUMF have received little attention in the academic debates over the war on terrorism.
The framework in Congressional Authorization built on the plurality opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,3 which devoted significant attention
to the AUMF. The framework, in a nutshell, is as follows: The meaning of the AUMF should be determined in the first instance by its text,
as informed by a comparison with authorizations of force in prior
wars, including declared wars. In clarifying the meaning of the “necessary and appropriate force” that Congress authorized,4 courts should
look primarily to two interpretive factors: Executive Branch practice
during prior wars and the international laws of war. Delegation concerns should not play a significant role in interpreting the AUMF, but
a clear statement requirement is appropriate when the President takes
actions under the AUMF that restrict the liberty of non-combatants in
the United States.
Congressional Authorization did not attempt to resolve every question that might arise under the AUMF. Instead, it sought to establish
a starting point for analysis that would be useful to courts and the ExT
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1 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047 (2005).
2 Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
3 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
4 See Authorization for Use of Military Force, § 2(a), 115 Stat. at 224.
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ecutive Branch in addressing the complex and sometimes novel issues
in the war on terrorism, and to stimulate academic discussion of Congress’s important enactment. The latter goal is well served by the
three Replies to Congressional Authorization in this issue of the Harvard Law Review.
Although each of the Replies approaches the AUMF from a different perspective, none expresses fundamental disagreement with our
framework. Professors Goodman and Jinks describe our framework as
“useful,” but maintain that we have understated the importance of the
international laws of war within the framework.5 Professor Sunstein
argues that administrative law should play a greater role than we suggested, and the international laws of war a less substantial role. He
also advocates a broader clear statement requirement.6 Otherwise, he
approaches the AUMF in ways similar to Congressional Authorization,
and reaches similar conclusions. Professor Tushnet suggests that ours
is a reasonable approach to interpreting the AUMF, but he maintains
that its very reasonableness demonstrates the danger of relying on
Congress to police executive power during wartime, and suggests that
the only solution may be a constitutional amendment.7
Below, we address three issues raised by these Replies: first, the
proper role of the international laws of war in the interpretation of the
AUMF; second, the circumstances in which a clear statement requirement is appropriate in ascertaining the scope of the AUMF; and third,
the implications of our analysis for the ability of the current constitutional system to ensure optimal tradeoffs between liberty and security
during war.
I. THE AUMF AND THE INTERNATIONAL LAWS OF WAR
Congressional Authorization argued that, in broadly authorizing
the President to use “all necessary and appropriate force,” Congress
implicitly authorized actions permitted under the international laws of
war. It also argued that, because the laws of war can inform the scope
of Congress’s authorization, they can also inform limitations on that
authorization. Absent textual or other evidence to the contrary, therefore, the AUMF should not be viewed as authorizing presidential actions in violation of the laws of war.8 As a result, such actions would
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
5 See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, International Law, U.S. War Powers, and the Global
War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2653 (2005).
6 See Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663 (2005).
7 See Mark Tushnet, Controlling Executive Power in the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 2673 (2005).
8 For reasons explained in Congressional Authorization, we limited this claim to jus in bello
rules of international law that govern the conduct of war and did not extend the claim to jus ad
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be valid only if they fell within the independent constitutional authority of the President.
Professor Sunstein and Professors Goodman and Jinks take different, and conflicting, positions on the proper role of the international
laws of war in our framework. While Professor Sunstein suggests that
Congressional Authorization overstates the importance of the laws of
war,9 Professors Goodman and Jinks contend that Congressional Authorization “systematically understate[s] the interpretive significance”
of this body of law.10 We address these positions in turn.
A. Relevance
In suggesting that the international laws of war should play a less
significant role than the one we proposed in Congressional Authorization, Professor Sunstein states that “it is best to start with statutory
text and more familiar administrative law principles.”11 We agree with
the beginning of this statement. The first two substantive parts of
Congressional Authorization focus on the text of the AUMF, its drafting history, and its relationship to past authorizations of force.12 We
disagree, however, with Professor Sunstein’s suggestion that “administrative law principles,” particularly the Chevron doctrine, have logical
priority over the international laws of war. As Professor Sunstein observes, Chevron deference is triggered only after a court determines,
using the appropriate tools of statutory construction, that the statutory
provision under consideration is silent or ambiguous.13 The international laws of war are one such tool for interpreting the AUMF and
therefore would properly be considered under the first step of the
Chevron doctrine, assuming, as Professor Sunstein contends, that doctrine applies to the AUMF.
The international laws of war reflect widely accepted background
norms, relating to the very subject of the authorization (the use of
force in international relations), against which Congress legislated.14
In addition, there is a long tradition of both courts and presidents rely–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
bellum rules governing when nations can use force. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at
2089–91.
9 See Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2664.
10 Goodman & Jinks, supra note 5, at 2653.
11 Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2664 n.7.
12 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2056–83.
13 See Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2665; see also Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 124 S.
Ct. 1236, 1248 (2004); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
n.9 (1984).
14 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2091–92; cf. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2664 n.7
(noting that the laws of war might “furnish a set of principles, vindicated by tradition, against
which authorizations for the use of force should be understood”).
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ing on the laws of war to inform the President’s wartime powers.15
This consistent understanding during wartime is an especially relevant
source of meaning because the AUMF purports to authorize presidential action in an area of concurrent presidential authority.16 Following
in this tradition, the Supreme Court plurality in Hamdi properly
looked to the laws of war in ascertaining the “necessary and appropriate” force that Congress authorized in the AUMF.17
We believe that Professor Sunstein’s resolution of the six hypotheticals that he poses at the outset of his Reply would be more nuanced
and persuasive if he looked to the international laws of war in interpreting the AUMF. For example, Professor Sunstein states that the
President’s ability to use force against entities that have assisted al
Qaeda only after the September 11 attacks poses a “difficult” issue, but
he does not attempt to resolve it.18 As we explained in Congressional
Authorization, the international law principles concerning cobelligerency provide useful guidance in resolving this issue.19 In addition, Professor Sunstein simply asserts that the killing of an American
citizen at a U.S. airport would not be a necessary and appropriate use
of force under the AUMF.20 The international law rules concerning
the use of force against unarmed and nonthreatening combatants, by

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
15
16
17
18
19

See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2091–92.
See id. at 2086 n.160, 2100.
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2641 (2004) (plurality opinion).
Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2667 & n.31.
See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2112–13. The text of the AUMF also provides
more guidance than suggested by Professor Sunstein. He states that we emphasize that “the
President could not use force against nations or individuals that cannot plausibly be connected
with the attacks of September 11, 2001.” Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2667 (emphasis added). This
description omits the AUMF’s reference to “organizations” with a connection to the September 11
attacks. Authorization for Use of Military Force, § 2(a), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, 224
(2001). As Congressional Authorization explained, terrorist organizations with an adequately
close post–September 11 connection to al Qaeda can properly be deemed part of an organization
responsible for the attacks. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2110–12. The international law co-belligerency standard is relevant only as a guide for determining the adequacy of the
connection. See id. at 2112.
20 See Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2668. It is unclear from Professor Sunstein’s treatment of his
hypotheticals how he views the “necessary and appropriate” language in the AUMF. For example,
although he views that language as precluding the use of excessive force in his hypothetical concerning the killing of a U.S. citizen at a U.S. airport, he does not impose such a restriction on excessive force in resolving the other hypotheticals, such as his hypotheticals about invading Iraq
based on the AUMF or detaining French citizens who provide financial support to organizations
that support al Qaeda. See id. at 2667–68. As we explained in Congressional Authorization, we
do not believe that Congress intended the phrase “necessary and appropriate” to operate as an
independent textual restriction beyond its possible implicit reference to prior Executive Branch
practice and the laws of war. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2081–82.
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contrast, provide more principled and refined justifications for his
conclusion.21
B. Significance
Professors Goodman and Jinks agree with us that the laws of war
are relevant to interpreting the AUMF, but they contend that we have
understated their significance.22 First, they argue that the laws of war
limit the class of individuals who can be subjected to the use of force
more substantially than we suggested. Second, they argue that the
President’s power to detain enemy combatants is subject to a broader
array of international law conditions than we suggested.
1. Individuals Covered by the AUMF. — Congress in the AUMF
authorized the use of force against “organizations” connected to the
September 11 attacks, 23 which uncontroversially includes al Qaeda.
In Congressional Authorization, we argued that, when it is unclear
whether an individual is a member of an organization covered by the
AUMF, the law-of-war criteria for combatancy can help resolve the issue. For example, because international law treats civilians who “directly participate” in hostilities as combatants who can be targeted and
detained, persons who directly participate in al Qaeda’s terrorist activities against the United States should be viewed as covered by the
AUMF.24
Professors Goodman and Jinks argue that the direct participation
standard is not merely a relevant consideration, it is the only relevant
consideration.25 Under their analysis, the President would not have
statutory authority to use force against or detain members of al Qaeda
unless those members had directly participated in hostilities against
the United States.26 They also suggest that many (and perhaps most)
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
21
22
23
24
25
26

See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2120–21 n.325.
See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 5, at 2653.
See Authorization for Use of Military Force, § 2(a), 115 Stat. at 224.
See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2115–16.
See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 5, at 2655, 2657.
Professors Goodman and Jinks overstate matters in claiming that the direct participation
standard is “precise,” id. at 2655, and suffers from only “modest . . . definitional squabbles,” id. at
2656. In its recent study on customary international law related to the laws of war, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), an organization expert in the laws of war and not unduly cautious about embracing progressive developments in customary international law, noted
that “[a] precise definition of the term ‘direct participation in hostilities’ does not exist.” I JEANMARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 22 (2005); see also id. (noting that state
practice “gives little or no guidance on the interpretation of the term ‘direct participation’”). U.S.
military and academic commentators have similarly noted the unsettled nature of this standard.
See, e.g., Michael E. Guillory, Civilianizing the Force: Is the United States Crossing the Rubicon?, 51 A.F. L. REV. 111, 116–20 (2001); Lisa L. Turner & Lynn G. Norton, Civilians at the Tip
of the Spear, 51 A.F. L. REV. 1, 28 (2001).
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members of al Qaeda do not meet this direct participation requirement.27
As an initial matter, although Professors Goodman and Jinks purport to rely on international law only for its “interpretive significance
for the AUMF,”28 their analysis loses sight of the AUMF. The class of
individuals subject to the AUMF is not, as they suggest, a free-floating
question of international law. The AUMF expressly authorizes the use
of force “against those . . . organizations” responsible for “the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001,”29 a description that, as
noted above, includes al Qaeda. As a result, individuals who are uncontroversially part of that organization — because, for example, they
admit to being members, or because they carry out orders in the organization’s chain of command — are covered by the AUMF regardless of whether they satisfy the direct participation standard.30
Even if it were proper to disregard the AUMF’s text, Professors
Goodman and Jinks’s insistence that direct participation is the only
criterion for combatant status in the armed conflict against al Qaeda
and related terrorist organizations is unsupported by the materials they
cite and is inconsistent with standard assumptions underlying the laws
of war. They assert that, under the laws of war, military force may be
used against only two categories of individuals — lawful combatants
and unlawful combatants — and, more importantly, that the latter
category is limited to civilians who directly participate in hostilities.31
As a result, Professors Goodman and Jinks contend that because
members of al Qaeda do not qualify as lawful combatants, they are
presumptively civilians and the United States cannot use force against
them unless they directly participate in hostilities against the United
States.32 Like any syllogism, the validity of this argument depends on
its premise, and the premise here — that in an armed conflict between
a state and a terrorist organization, the members of the terrorist organization are deemed civilians unless they directly participate in hostilities — is flawed. The only support Professors Goodman and Jinks
offer for this premise is Article 51 of the First Additional Protocol to
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
27
28
29

See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 5, at 2657–58.
Id. at 2654 n.5.
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224
(2001).
30 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2114–15. The authorization to use force against
“nations” would not imply an authority to use force against all members of a nation because the
international laws of war as applied to interstate conflicts specifically limit the use of force to a
nation’s armed forces and related direct participants in the war, and affirmatively immunize from
attack civilian non-combatants. By contrast, international law does not specifically limit the use
of force to only a subset of a militant terrorist organization, especially an organization that, like al
Qaeda, has as its defining purpose the waging of illegal war.
31 See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 5, at 2655.
32 See id. at 2657–58.
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the Geneva Conventions.33 The United States, however, has not ratified that Protocol. Moreover, Article 51 does not state that everyone
other than lawful combatants must be classified as civilians, let alone
that members of a terrorist organization must be so classified. Rather,
it merely states that civilians should receive certain protections “unless
and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”34
Professors Goodman and Jinks’s approach is also inconsistent with
standard assumptions underlying the laws of war. It is widely recognized that a nation involved in an armed conflict is permitted under
the laws of war to use force against most of the enemy’s armed forces,
regardless of whether those forces meet the direct participation standard.35 By contrast, Professors Goodman and Jinks would disallow
the use of force against most members of al Qaeda, even though al
Qaeda is a military organization dedicated to waging illegal war. Under their proposed approach, al Qaeda military recruits training in Afghanistan could not be targeted or detained because these members of
al Qaeda have not yet directly participated in hostilities. 36 Indeed,
Professors Goodman and Jinks’s analysis could lead to the absurd conclusion that even Osama bin Laden could not be targeted or detained,
since, while he is the leader of al Qaeda, it could be argued that he has
not directly participated in hostilities (or is no longer participating in
them). 37 In sum, Professors Goodman and Jinks’s approach to armed
conflicts would confer substantially more immunity from attack and
detention on unlawful combatant groups than on the lawful armed
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
33
34

See id. at 2655 nn.6–7.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted June 8, 1977, art. 51(3),
1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 26. The sources that Professors Goodman and Jinks cite concerning the scope of
the direct participation test, see Goodman & Jinks, supra note 5, at 2655–57 nn.8–28, do not suggest that members of terrorist groups must be treated in an armed conflict as non-combatants
unless they meet the test. Rather, these sources focus on the questions whether and when traditional civilian non-combatants can be deemed combatants because they directly participate in an
armed conflict.
35 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2114 & n.300; see also, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN,
THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICT 27 (2004) (noting that “[m]embers of the armed forces of a belligerent Party (except
medical and religious personnel)” are considered combatants “even if their specific task is not
linked to active hostilities” (citation omitted)); Knut Ipsen, Combatants and Non-Combatants, in
THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 65, 66 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995)
(“[F]or members of the armed forces combatant status is the rule, while the classification of noncombatant status is an exception.”).
36 See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 5, at 2657 (noting that “training” is not direct participation (quoting W. Hays Parks, Memorandum of Law: Executive Order 12333 and Assassination,
ARMY LAW., Dec. 1989, at 9 app. C)).
37 Cf. id. (articulating the direct participation test and concluding that “members [of the terrorist group] conducting ‘local intelligence, intermediate logistics, recruiting, [and] training’ would
retain their status as noncombatants” (second alteration in original) (quoting Parks, supra note 36,
at 9 app. C)).

2690

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118:2683

forces of enemy nations — a result directly at odds with the usual assumptions of the laws of war and with common sense.38
2. International Law Conditions. — Professors Goodman and
Jinks also claim that we have understated the extent to which international law imposes conditions on the President’s authority to detain
enemy combatants. In Congressional Authorization, we argued that
the President’s violation of the laws of war would not negate authority
otherwise implicitly conferred by the AUMF (such as the power to detain enemy combatants) unless the law-of-war rule in question were a
condition, under international law, of that authority.39 Professors
Goodman and Jinks agree with this claim, but they contend that there
will be a wide range of international law conditions that might be
relevant to actions taken under the AUMF.
Congressional Authorization did not purport to make a quantitative assessment of the number of international law rules that are, or
are not, conditions. We did argue, and Professors Goodman and Jinks
do not appear to dispute,40 that Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention (which calls for hearings before competent tribunals when there is
doubt about whether a captured belligerent qualifies as a prisoner of
war41) is not framed as a condition on the power to detain.42 We also
suggested that several other provisions in the Third Geneva Convention, such as access to a canteen, should not be viewed as conditions
on the detention power,43 but we made no other specific claims. As a
result, although Professors Goodman and Jinks phrase this portion of
their Reply as if it were a disagreement with our analysis, the basis for
their disagreement is unclear.
Without engaging in a point-by-point assessment of the various
rules they cite, we would emphasize that the rules must actually apply
to terrorist combatants for them to operate as conditions on presidential action under the AUMF. Yet Professors Goodman and Jinks never
establish that the various international law rules they cite actually do
apply in the conflict between the United States and terrorists covered
by the AUMF. For example, they assume without any argument or
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
38 Cf. A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 33 (2d ed. 2004) (noting that “there is a
strong argument that if a person belongs to a group of guerrilla fighters that carries out attacks on
opposing armed forces,” and the group does not conduct its operations in accordance with the
laws of war, “he may be considered to have forfeited his civilian status for the duration of his
membership of, or participation in the actions of, that group” (emphasis added)).
39 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2094–96.
40 See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 5, at 2660 n.39.
41 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949,
opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, art. 5, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3322–24, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 140–42 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention].
42 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2095–96.
43 See id. at 2095.
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qualification that the Third Geneva Convention (governing the treatment of prisoners of war) and the Fourth Geneva Convention44 (governing the treatment of “civilians”) apply in this conflict.45 The basis
for this assumption is never specified, and in the unqualified fashion in
which it is suggested by Professors Goodman and Jinks it is very likely
wrong. Among other things, Common Article 2 of these Conventions
appears to preclude their applicability to conflicts with non-state terrorist organizations. It provides that the Geneva Conventions “shall
apply to . . . any . . . armed conflict which may arise between two or
more of the High Contracting Parties.”46 Al Qaeda is not a state,
much less a high contracting party to the Geneva Conventions. Common Article 2 also applies the Geneva Conventions to a non-party
Power that “accepts and applies the provisions thereof.”47 It is doubtful that al Qaeda is a “Power” within the meaning of Common Article
2, but even if it were, it does not accept and apply the Conventions.48
For these reasons, the President appears to have correctly concluded
that al Qaeda is not a party to the Third Geneva Convention and is
therefore not covered by it.49
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
44 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August
12, 1949, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, art 79, 6 U.S.T. 3517, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
45 See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 5, at 2659–61.
46 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 41, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. at 3318, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136 (emphasis added).
47 Id.
48 Nor does it matter, for purposes of Common Article 2, that al Qaeda may have been fighting in conjunction with the Afghan Taliban forces, who we can assume (as President Bush determined) are covered by the Geneva Conventions. Common Article 2 states that, “[a]lthough one of
the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the Powers who are parties
thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations.” Id. This provision makes clear that
even when two states fight together against a third state in a traditional armed conflict, the third
state is bound by the Geneva Conventions only vis-à-vis the enemy that is a party to the Geneva
Conventions, not with respect to the enemy that is not a party to the Conventions. See, e.g.,
MORRIS GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 68, 97 (1959); HOWARD S.
LEVIE, PRISONERS OF WAR IN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS 24–25 (U.S. Naval War
Coll., Int’l Law Studies Vol. 59, 1979). At a minimum, the same rule should apply when the nonparty armed forces are members of a terrorist organization. In addition, al Qaeda probably cannot benefit from Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention, which provides that militias and
other volunteer corps that “belong[] to a Party to the conflict” can qualify as prisoners of war under the Convention if they satisfy the four traditional prerequisites for lawful combatancy. See
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 41, art. 4(a)(2), 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138. Because it is unlikely that al Qaeda “belongs to” Afghanistan (which is a Party to the conflict), one
need not even reach the issue whether it has satisfied the four traditional criteria (which, as Professors Goodman and Jinks acknowledge, it almost certainly has not, see Goodman & Jinks, supra
note 5, at 2657).
49 See Office of the White House Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at Guantanamo
(Feb. 7, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-13.html. Professors
Goodman and Jinks suggest that President Bush has “determine[d] that [the law of armed conflict] is inapplicable to the conflict” against terrorists and that the Executive Branch is not using
the law-of-war framework. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 5, at 2659 n.35. In fact, President Bush
simply determined that the Third Geneva Convention did not apply to the conflict with al Qaeda
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II. CLEAR STATEMENT REQUIREMENT
Congressional Authorization analyzed at length when a clear
statement requirement would be appropriate in interpreting the
AUMF.50 It concluded that a clear statement requirement is warranted for presidential wartime actions that restrict the liberty of noncombatants in the United States, but not for presidential actions that
restrict the liberty of combatants.51
Professor Sunstein proposes a different clear statement requirement. Specifically, he contends that, although the President should receive Chevron deference when he interprets the AUMF, “if the President is infringing on constitutionally sensitive interests, the AUMF
must be construed narrowly, whatever the President says.”52 He also
claims that, in interpreting the AUMF, “liberty should always receive
the benefit of the doubt.”53
In our view, this formulation is overly broad and indeterminate. It
is unclear what the phrase “constitutionally sensitive interests” (and
the related phrases that Professor Sunstein uses in his Reply54) entails.
For example, Professor Sunstein does not explain whether his clear
statement requirement is limited to constructions of the AUMF that
violate constitutional rights, or whether it also applies to constructions
that raise constitutional questions or, even more broadly, to constructions that implicate constitutional values. It is also unclear what Professor Sunstein means by “liberty.”55 Most presidential actions under
the AUMF will affect liberty, and many of these actions might also affect constitutionally sensitive interests, especially if they are directed
against U.S. citizens. For example, if the President orders the bombing
or detention of enemy combatants covered by the AUMF in Afghanistan, that action will have a significant effect on the liberty of those
combatants and may (especially if they are U.S. citizens) implicate constitutionally sensitive interests. Yet we doubt that Professor Sunstein
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
and that Taliban detainees did not qualify under the Convention for prisoner-of-war status. See
Office of the White House Press Sec’y, supra; see also William H. Taft, IV, The Law of Armed
Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient Features, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 319, 320 (2003) (then–Legal Adviser to the U.S. State Department stating that “[t]he body of the law of armed conflict would thus
apply — and, from a U.S. perspective, there was never a question of not applying the law, or of
stepping away from international rules”).
50 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2102–06.
51 See id. at 2106.
52 Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2664 (emphasis added).
53 Id. at 2672.
54 Professor Sunstein uses a variety of formulations for his clear statement test, and it is not
clear whether the different formulations all have the same meaning. Compare id. at 2664 (“constitutionally sensitive interests”), with id. at 2669 (“constitutionally protected interests”), and id. at
2672 (“constitutionally sensitive rights”).
55 See id. at 2668–70.
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believes Congress should be required to enact additional legislation
beyond the AUMF before the President could bomb or detain enemy
combatants in Afghanistan. Indeed, the Court in Hamdi implicitly
held that such additional legislation was unnecessary.56
Congressional Authorization argued that the relevant precedent
supports a more precise trigger for the clear statement requirement:
the requirement should apply when presidential actions under the
AUMF restrict the liberty of non-combatants in the United States, but
not when they restrict the liberty of combatants.57 The Supreme
Court in Duncan v. Kahanamoku58 and Ex parte Endo59 applied a
clear statement requirement in the context of presidential actions
against civilian non-combatants, but suggested that the same requirement would not apply if the President engaged in traditional military
functions against combatants.60 By contrast, in Ex parte Quirin,61 the
Court did not apply a clear statement requirement, even though the
case involved the detention and trial of a U.S. citizen — practices that
restricted liberty and presumably implicated constitutionally sensitive
interests. Similarly, the plurality in Hamdi did not purport to apply a
clear statement requirement, even though the case involved the detention of a U.S. citizen in the United States.62 The central difference between Duncan and Endo on the one hand, and Quirin and Hamdi on
the other, is that the latter cases involved actions taken against
combatants.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
56 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2640–42 (2004) (plurality opinion) (interpreting the
AUMF as authorizing detention of U.S. citizen enemy combatants captured in Afghanistan).
57 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2105–06.
58 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
59 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
60 See Duncan, 327 U.S. at 310; Endo, 323 U.S. at 300–04; see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2104–05. Professor Sunstein also relies on a district court decision by Judge
Learned Hand, Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). See Sunstein, supra
note 6, at 2669. In Masses, the court held that in the absence of specific congressional authorization, the Executive Branch could not interfere with U.S. mail in an effort to stop antiwar propaganda during World War I. 244 F. at 536, 539–41, 543. This decision is consistent with our position that a clear statement requirement is appropriate during wartime when the President takes
action to restrict the liberty of non-combatants in the United States. It is also worth noting that
the relevant government actor in Masses was the Postmaster General, whose authority, the court
noted, was entirely derived from statute. Id. at 538 (“The defendant’s authority is based upon the
act of Congress, and the intention of that act is the single measure of that authority.”). The decision therefore does not speak to situations in which the President is acting pursuant to independent constitutional authority.
61 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
62 Professor Sunstein asserts that the plurality implicitly and correctly found in the AUMF a
clear statement authorizing detention of U.S. citizens, see Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2670, but his
interpretation of the plurality opinion can only be sustained if one adopts a weak version of the
clear statement requirement — so weak, in fact, that it is not apparent what work the clear
statement requirement is doing. The AUMF, after all, does not even refer to detention, let alone
the detention of U.S. citizens, which was the presidential action at issue in Hamdi.
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In sum, the clear statement requirement outlined in Congressional
Authorization provides better guidance to courts and the Executive
Branch than the one proposed by Professor Sunstein, and is consistent
with Hamdi and prior Supreme Court decisions regulating presidential
power during wartime.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
Professor Tushnet suggests that our framework is premised on a
separation-of-powers model for supervising presidential power, by
which he means that it assumes that Congress is the primary agent for
policing Executive Branch wartime action and ensuring that the
President makes optimal wartime tradeoffs between liberty and security. He contends that the framework “indirectly challenge[s] the adequacy” of this model because it shows that the AUMF can reasonably
be interpreted to authorize actions in the United States that threaten
the liberties of U.S. citizens.63 He also expresses doubt about whether
the principal alternative model — a judicial-review model in which
courts are charged with controlling political branch excesses during
wartime — is any better, given the tendency of courts to defer to the
political branches.64 He concludes his Reply by suggesting the possibility of amending the Constitution in order to address the problem of
protecting liberty during wartime.65
Professor Tushnet’s questions about constitutional design, while
thought-provoking, are beyond the scope of our project. Ultimately,
Congressional Authorization is about how to interpret the AUMF
within the context of our current constitutional system, not how to design a system that would best regulate the conduct of war. We do,
however, have several observations about Professor Tushnet’s analysis.
First, Professor Tushnet appears to overstate the dichotomy between the separation-of-powers and judicial-review models. These
models have never been mutually exclusive means of regulating presidential action during wartime. For example, although the Supreme
Court has never invalidated a presidential wartime action that it concluded was authorized by Congress,66 it has sometimes exercised
searching judicial review to conclude that a seemingly authorized Ex–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
63
64
65
66

See Tushnet, supra note 7, at 2675.
See id. at 2679–80.
Id. at 2680–82.
The Court in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), stated that Congress could not
authorize military commissions to try non-combatant civilians where civilian courts were open,
id. at 121–22, but as the dissent there pointed out, this statement was dicta because Congress had
in fact prohibited, not authorized, the use of military commissions. See id. at 136 (Chase, C.J.,
dissenting).
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ecutive Branch action was not in fact authorized.67 The interpretive
tools that the Court has employed in these cases — such as requiring a
clear statement before construing a statute to authorize presidential
acts that impinge on the rights of U.S. citizen non-combatants — are
important aspects of our framework for interpreting the AUMF.68
Furthermore, the mere possibility of judicial review can have important effects on Executive Branch action, as evidenced by the Executive
Branch’s decision to confer additional procedural rights on enemy
combatants after the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hamdi and
Rasul last Term and especially after the Court made clear in those decisions that it would exercise judicial review over the Executive’s actions.69
Second, we believe that Professor Tushnet’s concerns stem from an
unduly narrow conception of the limitations in our framework on the
scope of Congress’s authorization in the AUMF. He maintains that
our framework’s “only operative limitation” on the AUMF is the September 11 nexus requirement.70 But Congressional Authorization
identifies many other important limits on what Congress authorized in
the AUMF, including the international laws of war, traditional practice, the clear statement requirement for action against noncombatants in the United States, and habeas corpus review, which includes an independent judicial assessment of, among other things, the
procedural adequacy of presidential determinations related to the detention, and possibly the trial, of enemy combatants.71
These factors preclude an interpretation of the AUMF that would
authorize Professor Tushnet’s hypothetical mass detention of Arab
American males in the United States.72 Since the AUMF only authorizes the use of force against “nations, organizations, or persons” with a
connection to the September 11 attacks,73 it would not authorize the
detention of Arab American males who do not have, and are not members of an organization that has, such a connection. Independent of
this textual limitation, the hypothesized mass detention would restrict
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
67 Two examples are Duncan and Endo. A third example is Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), in which the government and the dissent argued that the President
was simply taking care to execute an array of congressional statutes related to national security.
See id. at 701 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
68 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2102–06.
69 See id. at 2126–27.
70 Tushnet, supra note 7, at 2675.
71 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2122; see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct.
2633, 2636–39 (2004) (plurality opinion) (allowing a U.S. citizen detained in the United States as
an enemy combatant to challenge the factual basis for his designation through a writ of habeas
corpus).
72 See Tushnet, supra note 7, at 2673.
73 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224
(2001).
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the liberty of non-combatants in the United States, and thus should
not be viewed as authorized by Congress absent a clear statement.
Professor Tushnet discounts these limitations, and focuses instead
on the past Executive Branch practice of interning civilians in the
United States — most notably, the exclusion and internment of Japanese Americans during World War II.74 Since our framework contemplates that Executive Branch practice in prior wars informs the meaning of the AUMF, he concludes that it is plausible within our
framework to view the AUMF as authorizing his hypothesized detention. Professor Tushnet’s conclusion, however, cannot survive other
elements of the framework, which, as just noted, rule out the possibility of the hypothesized mass detention. Moreover, even considering
Executive Branch practice alone, his conclusion would not follow.
The reason that Executive Branch practice is relevant to interpreting
the AUMF is that Congress legislates against the backdrop of that
practice and, absent evidence to the contrary, is presumed to accept
it.75 Congress, however, cannot plausibly be viewed as having approved the practice of excluding and interning Japanese Americans
during World War II. To the contrary, Congress has made clear that it
disapproves of that internment. In 1988, it “acknowledge[d] the fundamental injustice of the evacuation, relocation, and internment of
United States citizens and permanent resident aliens of Japanese ancestry during World War II,”76 and authorized the payment of monetary compensation to the victims of the internment.77 Moreover, as we
noted in Congressional Authorization, 78 the legislative history of 18
U.S.C. § 4001(a), which states that “[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or
otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of
Congress,” suggests that Congress specifically wanted to avoid a repetition of that sort of detention of non-combatants.79
Third, although we agree with Professor Tushnet that during wartime Congress faces political and institutional hurdles to policing Executive Branch action, and that the courts often defer to the political
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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75
76

See Tushnet, supra note 7, at 2676–77.
See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2085–86.
Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, § 1(1), 102 Stat. 903, 903 (codified at 50
U.S.C. app. § 1989 (2000)).
77 See id. § 105, 102 Stat. at 905–08 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989b-4).
78 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2106 n.271.
79 See H.R. REP. NO. 92-116, at 2 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1435, 1435–36. In
contrast, Congress has not expressed disapproval of, and there has not been general criticism of,
the detention of hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war — including some U.S. citizens — in
the United States during World War II. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2106–07 n.271.
This fact, in addition to the approach taken by the Supreme Court in several World War II–era
decisions, supports our claim that the AUMF is best viewed as authorizing the President to detain
those who qualify as enemy combatants under the AUMF, even though it does not authorize the
detention of non-combatants.
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branches, we do not believe that these observations by themselves establish the case for amending the Constitution. Among other things,
Professor Tushnet’s claim that the current constitutional system is inadequate depends on the assumption that the President (who, despite
the points noted by Professor Tushnet, remains regulated by Congress
and the courts, scrutinized by the press, and subject to regular elections) will, in acting pursuant to the AUMF, overvalue national security and undervalue individual liberty, and that he is doing so in the
war on terrorism. Professor Tushnet neither justifies this assumption
nor offers an example of a presidential act authorized by the AUMF
that would involve such an improper tradeoff between security and
liberty.80 Moreover, any defense of his assumption would be difficult,
since it would depend on a contested normative baseline for the appropriate balance between security and liberty, as well as contested
factual assumptions about the security threats the nation currently
faces.
Finally, to justify an amendment to the Constitution, Professor
Tushnet would need to show that there is a realistic alternative to the
current constitutional arrangement that would operate better in practice. He tentatively suggests a constitutional amendment to create an
institution of elected judges, legislators, military officers, and civilians
who would promulgate and enforce “legally binding rules for the conduct of military engagements.”81 It is not obvious why such an institution would do a better job than our current constitutional scheme of
balancing liberty and security, but it does seem likely that such an institution would be less effective in fighting wars.
IV. CONCLUSION
Each of the three Replies offers a useful perspective on the framework for interpreting the AUMF that we set forth in Congressional
Authorization. Despite our disagreement with some aspects of the Replies, we believe that they confirm the importance of focusing on the
AUMF, at least as a starting point, in making legal assessments of the
President’s authority in the war on terrorism.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
80 As noted above, we do not believe that his hypothetical about mass detention of Arab
Americans can plausibly be said to be authorized by the AUMF.
81 Tushnet, supra note 7, at 2681.

